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ARGUMENT
I. PETITIONER USED THE CORRECT STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Appellee (hereinafter "Karen" or "Respondent") claims Petitioner uses the
wrong standard of review because the Court dismissed this case, as it "was not persuaded
by the evidence" presented by Petitioner, as opposed to a failure to present a prima facie
case. However, Respondent mixes the directions in Rule 41 (b) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure (hereinafter "URCP") with the clarification provided in Sorenson v.
Sorenson, to come to this conclusion. 783 P.2d 1141,1144 (Utah App. 1994).
Rule 41 (b) URCP, governing involuntary dismissals, provides that defendant
"may move for a dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has
shown no right to relief. The court may then "render judgment against the plaintiff or
may decline to render any judgment until the close of all the evidence." Rule 41(b)
URCP. Then the rule says: "If the court renders judgment on the merits against the
plaintiff, the court shall make findings as provided in Rule 52(a)" and explains further
that a dismissal under subsection (b) is a dismissal on the merits. Rule 41(b) URCP.
As stated by Respondent, the court, in Sorenson v. Sorenson, does clarify that dismissal
under Rule 41 (b) URCP is appropriate in two circumstances and each has a different
standard of review. 783 P.2d at 1144. "Failure to establish a prima facie case . . . is a
question of law", which is "reviewed for correctness." Id, A "clearly erroneous standard
[is appropriate] because the trial court was not persuaded by the evidence." Id,
Respondent then concludes, without basis that, in this case, the court received the
evidence "but was not convinced by it" and therefore the correct standard is "clearly
Brief of Appellant
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erroneous".

Respondent's brief, p.8. However, the court made no findings, which

indicate that it dismissed either because it believed Petitioner failed to make a prima facie
case or because it was unconvinced by the evidence presented.
A prima facie case is defined as the "establishment of a legally required rebuttable
presumption; a party's production of enough evidence to allow the fact-trier to infer the
fact at issue and rule in the party's favor." BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1209 (7th ed.
1999). In fact, in the Order of Dismissal in this case, prepared by Respondent, it states
"[tjhere was no evidence to show an intent or desire by the Respondent to move in or live
with Mr. Gerkin. The evidence did not establish that the Respondent was cohabitating
with Mr. Gerken." Further, Respondent's Order indicates "the Court granted a directed
verdict". R.443-442. (Attached as Exhibit "A"). This means the court believed
Petitioner did not present a prima facie case, for which the standard is reviewed for
correctness.
In Sorensen, the court noted that the question in that case was the "existence of an
implied-in-fact employment contract as a question of fact." Sorenson v. Sorenson, 783
P.2d at 1144. This would necessitate a clearly erroneous standard. Pendleton v.
Pendleton, 918 P.2d 159, 160 (Utah App. 1996). However, the question in this case is
the termination of alimony, which is "a mixed question of fact and law." Haddow v.
Haddow, 707 P.2d 669, 671 (Utah 1985). While the court should "defer to the trial
court's factual findings unless they are show to be clearly erroneous, [it should] review
its ultimate conclusion for correctness". Pendleton v. Pendleton, 918 P.2d 159, 160
(Utah App. 1996). This is because the "ultimate conclusion" is a question of law.
2

Therefore, while the factual findings are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard, the
"ultimate conclusion" should be reviewed for correctness. Pendleton v. Pendleton, 918
P.2dat 160.
II. PETITIONER MARSHALLED THE APPROPRIATE EVIDENCE
Respondent claims that Petitioner did not marshal all the evidence necessary under
Rule 24 (a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Respondent then proceeds to
include a litany of "evidence" which she claims was presented at trial and not
"marshaled" by the Petitioner.
"The challenging party must marshal all relevant evidence presented at trial which
tends to support the findings . . . " Bell v. Elder, 782 p.2d 545, 547 (Utah App.
1989)(emphasis in original). Marshalling "provides the appellate court the basis from
which to conduct a meaningful and expedient review of facts challenged on appeal."
Robb v. Anderton, 863 P.2d 1322, 1328 (Utah App. 1993).
The Utah courts have identified many cases in which the efforts in marshalling
were inadequate. Some appellants merely present carefully selected facts and excerpts of
trial testimony in support of their own position, conveniently omitting negative facts.
See, Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 312 (Utah 1999); Johnson v. Higley, 977 P.2d
1209, 1218 (Utah App. 1999). Some parties incorrectly state marshaled "facts" to try to
improve their position. See, Johnson v. Board of Review of the Indus. Comm 'n. 842 P.2d
910, 912 (Utah App. 1992)(appellant stated he missed no work days though record
showed he missed at least nine days). Finally, some appellants merely reargue the same
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case made before the trial court. Moon v. Moon, 973 P.2d 431, 437 (Utah App. 1999).
See, generally, Norman H. Jackson, Utah Standards of Appellate Review - Revised, 12
UTAH BAR JOURNAL, 8, 13 (1999); Norman H. Jackson, Utah Standards of Appellate
Review, 8 UTAH BAR JOURNAL, 9, 13 (1994).
Respondent overstates the burden somewhat in claiming Petitioner "falls short of
meeting the marshaling threshold". Respondent's brief, p. 11. Most of the "evidence"
which Respondent claims Petitioner did not provide to this court is not direct evidence of
a lack of co-habitation, but instead, rebuttal to evidence put on by Petitioner. This
rebuttal evidence propounded by Respondent does not move a fact forward so much as
offer an explanation for some of the evidence presented by Petitioner. There is no
requirement that "marshaling the evidence" forces Petitioner to repeat all the hypothetical
explanations that Respondent's counsel may create in cross-examination for the evidence
presented by Petitioner.
For example, Respondent claims Petitioner should have included the evidence that
when the private investigator testified he never saw anyone or Karen's [Respondent's]
truck at the Cedar View house, upon cross examination, he acknowledged the truck could
have been in the garage. Respondent's brief, p. 13. In fact, when not seen in front of the
house, the truck could have been anywhere else in the world, including where
Respondent's counsel suggested, but that suggestion does not have to be included in
Petitioner's marshaling of the evidence against him. Then Respondent presents a litany
of the things the witness did not see, again based upon counsel's cross-examination and
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presentation of hypothetical situations. Respondent's brief, p. 14. All possible scenarios
raised by counsel in cross-examination need not be included in the marshaling standard.
Further, other "evidence" Respondent claims was omitted is evidence that carries
no weight on the relevant issues. For example, Respondent criticizes Petitioner for
omitting the fact that Respondent still had toiletries of hers in her own home; however,
this was never disputed. Respondent's brief, p. 12. Nor is it particularly relevant. The
fact that other individuals very occasionally drove Respondent's truck was also
undisputed. Respondent's brief, p. 13. However, the fact that "Mr. Richard
acknowledged that Karen's truck could have been in the garage at Cedar View" was, in
fact, included in Petitioner's brief at p. 9.
Respondent mischaracterizes the "evidence" cited by Petitioner in her claims that
he has not marshaled adequately. For example in asserting that Dane Gerkin took the
truck whenever he wanted to, she claims Petitioner cited to a statement of his counsel at
525:144:24 to 525:145:1, rather than to Respondent's contrary testimony. However,
Respondent ignores the fact that there were actually three citations to that fact reference,
and the other references all refer to other witnesses besides Karen Sursa's self-serving
testimony. Further, the other trial testimony referenced was clear that Karen Sursa
frequently allowed Dane Gerkin to drive her truck without her. R.525;91:5-17; 525:92:23; 525:144:24-145:1.
Respondent claims that Petitioner did not include the evidence of the "very limited
sexual contact with Mr. Gerkin". Respondent's brief, p. 16. However, Petitioner's brief
states, as does Respondent's brief, that Karen testified they had a sexual relationship for
5

the first few months but now the relationship was platonic. Petitioner's brief, p. 10. The
fact that Respondent stayed with Dane Gerkin sometimes because she was "dependent on
him for health or other reasons." is also referenced in Petitioner's brief, though as a fact
that supports Petitioner's claim, not the Respondent's. Therefore, it was not included in
the marshaling section. Petitioner's brief, p.20.
Finally, Respondent attempts to claim that deposition testimony, which was not
introduced at trial, was evidence that should have been included in the marshalling of
facts against Petitioner's position. Respondent's brief, p. 12. This is outside the scope of
the marshaling requirement.
II. PETITIONER PRESENTED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH
COHABITATION
Petitioner alleges that the evidence, which Respondent submitted, at trial, did not
establish that she cohabitated with Dane Gerkin. She claims she and Mr. Gerkin did not
share a common residence, had an "abbreviated sexual involvement", and did not share
expenses. Respondent's brief, p.24-28.
As stated, the rule for terminating alimony consists of showing "the former
spouses is residing with a person . .. and engaging in sexual contact with the person,"
based upon an objective, not subjective, standard. Sigg v. Sigg, 905 P.2d 908, 917 (Utah
App. 1995). Cohabitation is comprised of. .. two elements: (1) common residency and
(2) sexual contact evidencing a conjugal association." Pendleton v. Pendleton, 918 P.2d
159, 161 n.l (Utah App. 1996).
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A. THE PARTIES SHARED A COMMON RESIDENCE
Petitioner alleges the parties did not share a common residence because there was
no evidence that "either kept furniture or clothing at the other's home other than the
clothing Ms. Sursa had on the occasion she was recuperating from an illness at Mr.
Gerkin's home." Respondent's brief, p. 19. She further justifies this occasion because
she was allegedly "recuperating from an illness . .. just even occupying one of his beds
but was lying on the floor." Respondent's brief, p. 19. This sanitization of the
circumstances of this incident is a remarkable mischaracterization of the evidence
presented to the trial court. In fact, Karen was lying on the floor wearing underwear and
Dane Gerkin's T-shirt. R. 525:22:23; 525:41:5. Further, "her bra was on the floor with
her pants". R.525:22:23-24. Her "pursue, her cigarettes, her keys, and her clothes and
her shoes" were also there, though not on her. R.525:23:12-13. Dane Gerkin was
dressed in "red cut-off sweats and a green T-shirt." R.525:22:15. They had made a bed
on the floor with a blanket belonging to Karen. R.525:23:7-9: 525:22:20-21.
Karen alleges she and Dane Gerkin only occasionally ate together, and "overnight
visits were rare". Respondent's brief, p. 19-20. However, she is selectively presenting
her own self-serving testimony in support of these claims, while ignoring the balance of
the evidence presented.
Karen was unemployed and spent most of her time at the home of Dane Gerkin as
evidenced by her conversations with her daughter. R.525:22:6. Her truck was usually
seen at his home regularly for over a year and rarely seen at her own home. R. 525:93:23
-94:8; 525:71:15-21; 525:73:12. Her children could usually only get ahold of her on
7

her cell phone, while she was at Dane Gerkin's. R. 525:25:23-25; R.525:27:9-23. Karen
did pay some of Dane's expenses, though she tried to claim it was in exchange for
pictures he drew for her. R: 525:35:14-20.

Dane cared for Karen, as a husband would

care for a wife. This was particularly evidence when she preferred going home with him
instead of her children after her trip to the hospital for an overdose. R. 525:31:4-10;
525:31:23-32:23. They ate at Dane's home an unknown number of times, and also went
out to eat publicly "once or twice a week", and were seen together all over town,
frequently. R. 525:120:18-22. This evidence is consistent with the facts in Sigg v. Sigg
and Pendleton v. Pendleton to show a shared residence. 905 P.2d 908 (Utah App. 1995);
918 P.2d 159 (Utah App. 1996).
B. THE PARTIES HAD A SEXUAL "CONJUGAL" RELATIONSHIP
Karen appears to acknowledge that she had sexual contact with Dane Gerkin but
that because it was "for only a two-month time period" by her testimony, it was not the
type of sexual contact requisite to prove cohabitation. Respondent's brief, p.23. She
distinguishes this from the few months of sexual contact present in Pendleton, since the
parties there were still involved in sexual contact at the time of trial. Id., citing
Pendleton v. Pendleton, 918 P. 2d at 160.
There is no legal basis for Karen's claim that if sexual contact has allegedly
terminated prior to trial, cohabitation did not exist. In fact, it is counter-intuitive, since
many parties would cease the actions for which they have been brought before the court,
after the initiation of litigation. Further, Karen's claims the relationship changed from a
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sexual one to a more of a "friendship" because of her illness, but even then they spent the
night at each other's home and that Dane Gerkin took care of her. R. 525:146:2.
"Conjugal rights" are defined as "the rights of married persons which include 'the
enjoyment of association, sympathy, confidence, domestic happiness, the comforts of
dwelling together . . . as well as the intimacies of domestic relations.'" BARRON'S LAW
DICTIONARY 88 (2nd ed. 1984). This defines exactly the relationship of Karen and
Dane Gerkin, as evidenced by the extensive testimony presented at trial.
Respondent claims that she does not have the burden to disprove sexual contact
because the statute changed and the "cases that he relies on were based on a former
version of the statute that provided for that split in he burden." Respondent's brief,
p. 17n. 1. She further alleges. "[T]he present statute now clearly puts that burden on Mr.
Sursa." Id.

In fact, as noted in Petitioner's original brief, (p. 17), the statute changed in

1995 and the cases relied on primarily are Sigg v. Sigg, and Pendleton v. Pendleton,
which were ruled upon in 1995 and 1996 respectively. 905 P.2d 908, 917 (Utah App.
1995); 918 P.2d 159, 161 n.l (Utah App. 1996).
III. THE COURT USED THE WRONG STANDARD
It is clear from the court's statements, in this case that it believed that the parties
were supporting each other and had ongoing sexual contact. It identified Dane Gerkin as
"like a gigolo" but that, obviously based upon its subjective opinion, Karen Sursa would
clearly "not want to spend the rest of her life with somebody like that." R.525:159:17-19.
The court further recognized from the evidence presented that, in addition to above
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description of the parties' relationship, Karen was "dependent on him" [Dane Gerkin].
R.525:259:16. Based upon these findings, together with the appropriate standard, the
court should have concluded that Karen Sursa and Dane Gerkin had cohabitated, thus
terminating Petitioner's alimony obligation.

IV. PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO HAVE THE AWARD OF ATTORNEYS
FEES REVERSED
The lower court ordered Petitioner to pay $14,656.63 for Respondent's attorney
fees. This amount has been deposited with the court pending the outcome of the
appellate court. R.512-514. This court should reverse the ruling of the lower court on
the issue of cohabitation. If it does so, then the court should also reverse its ruling on
attorneys' fees and Petitioner should be entitled to a return of these funds.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing facts and argument Petitioner respectfully requests that
the court reverse the trial court and conclude that Respondent, Karen Sursa, cohabitated
with Dane Gerkin. Based thereon, alimony should therefore, be terminated and Petitioner
should be entitled to retain the funds paid into the court for Respondent's attorney fees.
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DATED this / Q day of February 2005.
SCRIBNER & McCANDLESS, P.C.

BY:
LOTTIED. FOWLKE
DONALD E. McCANDLESS
Attorneys for Petitioner
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Addendum 1

FILED
DISTRICT COURT
DUCHESNE COUNTY, UTAH

OCT 1 0 2003
JOANNE Mc^EE, CLERK
CLARK

B ALLRED

-

0055

BY

r^.1 /

DEPUTY

CLARK A. McCLELLAN - 6113
McKEACHNIE, ALLRED, McCLELLAN & TROTTER, P.C.
Attorneys for Respondent
72 North 300 East (123-14)
Roosevelt, Utah
84066
Telephone: (435) 722-3928
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH, ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT

KENNETH D. SURSA,

)
)
Petitioner, )

vs.

ORDER OF
DISMISSAL

)

KAREN J. SURSA,

)

Civil No. 004000114 DA

Respondent. )

Judge John R. Anderson

The above captioned matter came before the Court for trial
on September 22, 2003.

The Petitioner, Kenneth E. Sursa, was

present with his attorney Bryan Sidwell.

The Respondent, Karen J.

Sursa,

Clark

was

Petitioner

present
called

with
several

her

attorney

witnesses

and

B

then

Allred.

The

rested.

The

Respondent moved for a directed verdict and requested that the
Petitioner's petition be dismissed.

The Court having heard the

evidence and argument from counsel and having reviewed the case law
and other information provided granted the motion and based thereon
makes and enters the following order.

1.

The issue before the Court was whether the Court should

terminate the Petitioner's obligation to pay alimony on the claim
that the Respondent was cohabitating with Dane Gerken.
2.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(10), the Petitioner

who is seeking to terminate alimony, had the burden to establish
that the Respondent, Karen J. Sursa, was cohabitating with Dane
Gerken.
3.

The evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to

the Petitioner, shows that the Respondent and Mr. Gerken had a
friendship and a dating relationship.

There was no evidence to

show an intent or desire by the Respondent to move in or live with
Mr. Gerken. The evidence did not establish that the Respondent was
cohabitating with Mr. Gerken.

The facts did not meet either the

residency or the sexual relationship requirements, required by the
case law to establish cohabitation.
4.

The Petitioner dismissed his alternative claim to

reduce alimony based on a change of financial circumstances prior
to the trial.
5.

Because the Court granted a directed verdict evidence

was not received on the issue of reimbursement of legal fees. The
Respondent had submitted to the Court an affidavit regarding the
attorney fees and costs she has incurred thru September 15, 2 003.
The Court Therefore Orders as follows:
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